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Discussion in 'General Motorcycling Discussion' started by Deadsy, Mar 23, 2013.
When you wheelie for an oncoming bike and they don't react at all.
Who knows this feel?
turn around take them out
I can't wheelie back
Is it ok if I just hold up a point score?
Try doing it for a police bike, you should get a reaction then.
thats when you should turn around and take them out
But do you wheelie to scooters?
i always nod at cop bikes, never had them nod back.
My experiences are that the further out of the city you get the more reactive they are.
Don't expect to get a reaction out of me except a shake of the head.
Deadsy v Police 
1. This is an appeal against conviction.
2. The appellant, Netrider Deadsy, was charged inter alia with the offence of driving at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public, contrary to section 46 of the Road Traffic Act 1961. On 27 December 2012, following a trial, a magistrate convicted the appellant of the charge.
3. Section 46 of the Road Traffic Act relevantly provides:
(1) A person must not drive a vehicle recklessly or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public.
(2) In considering whether an offence has been committed under this section, the court must have regard to:
(a) the nature, condition and use of the road on which the offence is alleged to have been committed; and
(b) the amount of traffic on the road at the time of the offence; and
(c) the amount of traffic which might reasonably be expected to enter the road from other roads and places; and
(d) all other relevant circumstances, whether of the same nature as those mentioned or not.
4. The prosecution case was that at about 7:55 pm on 10 October 2012, a police officer observed the appellant on a motorcycle with a pillion passenger. The appellant was stopped at the traffic lights on Marion Road at the intersection of Marion Road and South Road. The officer was also on a motorcycle.
5. The officer observed the appellant accelerate rapidly from the stationary position and in that process do "a wheelie". This meant that the appellant drove in a manner in which the front wheel of his motorcycle left the ground and he rode forward with only the rear wheel in contact with the road surface.
6. It was the Crown case that following this incident the appellant rapidly increased speed until he was travelling at an alleged speed of over kilometres per hour in a 70 kilometre per hour zone along Flagstaff Road. The police officer followed the appellant. The appellant then, on the Crown case, approached a roundabout where he slowed and weaved in and out of traffic in a manner that the police officer described as dangerous. Having cleared the roundabout, the appellant then accelerated again to a speed of over 130 kilometres per hour in an 80 kilometre per hour zone along Happy Valley Drive.
7. The police motorcyclist activated his warning lights and sounded his siren. The appellant did not appear to respond. The police motorcyclist then drew along side the appellant and indicated that he should pull over. The appellant did so.
8. Flagstaff Road is winding for approximately 2 kilometres and then straightens. A number of other roads are accessed from the relevant section of Flagstaff Road. There are two lanes for southbound and one lane for northbound traffic. However, this changes depending on the time of day. At the Black Road intersection, which is controlled by the roundabout, there are two lanes for southbound with a large median strip to separate the southbound from northbound traffic. Happy Valley Drive has one lane for each direction of travel. A broken white line separates the two lanes. The police officer described Happy Valley Drive as a "slow, continuous bend".
9. At trial, the appellant acknowledged having accelerated in a manner that led to his front wheel leaving the ground but explained that this was occasioned by a bump in the road. The appellant denied having attained speeds of over 130 kilometres per hour but acknowledged that his speed was well above the speed limit for the area. He assessed his speed to have been between 100 to 120 kilometres per hour.
10. The appellant denied having weaved between traffic in the vicinity of the roundabout. He explained in his evidence that he moved between traffic in a staggered fashion and in a manner that he considered to be safe. The appellant acknowledged that he sped up beyond the speed limit but again maintained that his speed did not exceed 100 to 120 kilometres per hour.
11. The appellant claimed to be unaware of the police motorcyclist that was following him and did not hear the siren. He explained that his motorcycle’s rear vision mirrors provided limited rear vision because of his size. He said that the helmet that he was wearing and the noise of his motorcycle made hearing difficult.
12. In the course of his evidence, the appellant informed the magistrate that this was one of the first occasions, if not the first, that he had ridden this particular motorcycle with a pillion passenger. He explained that he was a very experienced motorcycle rider and that he considered that he could travel quite safely at the speeds at which he was travelling on this occasion. He acknowledged that there were other motorists on the roadway in the vicinity of the roundabout but claimed that no danger was occasioned to those motorists. On those sections of road where he exceeded the speed limit, he claimed that whilst there was limited traffic, no other motorists were endangered by his actions.
13. The learned magistrate preferred the evidence of the appellant to that of the police officer as to speed. However, the magistrate preferred the evidence of the police officer as to the manner in which the appellant moved through traffic in the vicinity of the roundabout.
14. The magistrate reached the conclusion that to ride at the speeds admitted by the appellant and in the manner observed by the police officer amounted to driving at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public. In the course of her reasoning, the magistrate concluded:
"To make it quite clear to the defendant why, I note: it is a 70 zone, it is a built-up area, you should not drive at those speeds – even if Happy Valley Road or Flagstaff Road are well-known to you – in a built up area. Although there may have been slip lanes around Flagstaff Hill, it is clear...that there are enough vehicles expected at that time of night to be emerging from either side to assure me that there was a great potential of danger."
15. On appeal the appellant, who appeared in person, submitted that the police officer’s opportunity to observe his manoeuvres through the roundabout was limited due to the distances separating the officer from the roundabout. It was submitted that the officer was too far away to be able to make reliable observations. The appellant sought to tender plans and photographs to make good this point.
16. At trial the appellant had been represented by counsel and the plans and photographs, the subject of the proposed tender on appeal, were either in existence then or could have been in existence if reasonable steps had been taken. It is evident that a number of the documents were at the bar table at trial, and pursuant to a considered decision, were not tendered.
17. It is not appropriate to receive this material on appeal. The trial was deliberately conducted without reference to that evidence when the evidence was either available or could have been available if reasonable steps had been taken at the time. No basis has been established that would permit the receipt of further evidence on appeal.
18. The findings of fact made by the magistrate were open to her. No error has been shown in her process of reasoning. The appellant has not shown that she had regard to any immaterial consideration or failed to have regard to any relevant consideration. The issue is not whether a judge on appeal would reach a different conclusion but whether the conclusion reached by the magistrate was open on the evidence. In my view it was. Accordingly, the challenge to the factual findings cannot be sustained.
19. The appellant further contended that, notwithstanding those findings, his conduct did not amount to driving at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public. He drew attention to the width of the carriageways and the generally quiet road conditions at the time.
20. As earlier observed, the appellant claimed that he was a highly skilled, young, alert motorcyclist who could safely travel at the speed at which and in the manner in which he travelled on this occasion.
21. The conduct of a driver is to be assessed according to an objective standard. In Coventry, Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ observed:
"The standard is impersonal [and universal] in the sense that it does not vary with individuals, and it is universal in the sense that it is applicable in the case of all persons who drive motor vehicles... But, speaking generally, the expression ‘driving at a speed, or in a manner, which is dangerous to the public’ describes the actual behaviour of the driver and does not require any given state of mind as an essential element of the offence."
22. In McBride, Barwick CJ noted:
"The section speaks of a speed or manner which is dangerous to the public. This imports a quality in the speed or manner of driving which either intrinsically in all circumstances, or because of the particular circumstances surrounding the driving, is in a real sense potentially dangerous to a human being or human beings who as a member or as members of the public may be upon or in the vicinity of the roadway on which the driving is taking place. It may be, of course, that potential danger to property on or in the vicinity to that roadway would suffice to make the speed or manner of driving dangerous to the public... A person may drive at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public without causing any actual injury: it is the potentiality in fact of danger to the public in the manner of driving, whether realized by the accused or not, which makes it dangerous to the public within the meaning of the section.
This concept [dangerous driving] is in sharp contrast to the concept of negligence. The concept with which the section deals requires some serious breach of the proper conduct of a vehicle upon the highway, so serious as to be in reality and not speculatively, potentially dangerous to others. This does not involve a mere breach of duty however grave, to a particular person, having significance only if damage is caused thereby."
23. The meaning of "dangerous to the public" was also discussed by Wells J in Pope v Hall:
... in all the circumstances, the impeached driving passed beyond the point where it represented a mere departure - and nothing more serious - from the rules of the ordinary highway code, and became so serious a departure from those rules that the manner or speed of the driving ... created a wholly unreasonable and unwarranted danger to the life, or limb, or both, of other road users ... If one were directing a jury one would say: Ask yourselves how likely it was, in the circumstances, that an accident of some sort would occur, and, at the same time, assuming that an accident did occur, how serious it would be; it will be by weighing both those factors together that you will be able to determine the degree of risk created by the situation - in other words, how dangerous the defendant’s driving was.
24. The term "public" is not defined by the Road Traffic Act. However, the remarks of Burbury CJ when dealing with a comparable section in Smith are apposite:
The ‘public’ endangered by the speed or manner of his driving and therefore protected by the statute is therefore not to be regarded as a number of particular individuals endangered but as an innominate class. It is the section of the community as an aggregate shown to be actually or potentially within the ambit of danger created by the speed or manner of driving. The section is not concerned with breach of duty to drive carefully vis-a-vis a particular person.
25. In Mark Senior v Police, Sulan J in considering whether a driver himself or herself could constitute a member of the public noted:
There is a significant public interest in preventing road accidents, even those where the victim is the driver who is alone in a vehicle with no other persons being put at risk by the driving. The policy of the Act is to ensure that drivers of motor vehicles comply with the rules of the road and drive safely to avoid accidents which may result in death, injury or damage. There is both a social and economic cost to the community if road users are injured in accidents involving only themselves.
26. All road users, and in particular vehicle drivers and motorcyclists, should be alert to the dangers of the road. The everyday "carnage on the road" should bring home to all the need for vigilance and care. The need for defensive driving is important. These factors emphasise the need for compliance with the road rules. The observations of Wells J in Stoeckel v Harpas concerning the need for defensive driving remain relevant more than three decades on:
Three or four decades ago it was, speaking generally, reasonable to expect a driver to deal with the exigencies of motor and pedestrian traffic as they presented themselves from moment to moment, but he was not asked to look very far ahead and to seek out possible trouble. Today, I think that the situation has changed fundamentally. Population has increased; a high proportion of families have at least one car and not infrequently two; accidents are numerous; and death on the roads has become tragically familiar. In these circumstances, I think courts, when performing the role of a jury, are entitled, indeed bound, to require of motorists a measure of what is sometimes called defensive driving, or a look out that not only sees immediate, or immediately developing, danger, but looks well ahead and searches for potential danger.
Nowadays, for example, a young child on the footpath is not just a person so many feet away, but is a human being that may suddenly present himself in your path; a green light is not just an authority to spring off the mark without further thought, but is an invitation to look to right and left before moving off in case someone is trying unsuccessfully to beat the lights; a bus is not just a stationary vehicle, but represents cover from which at any time, a pedestrian may emerge; a car with its turning flicker on may not be going to turn, but may have left his flicker on inadvertently; the car that you are following is to be kept a respectable distance in front of you because, at any moment, the driver may stop or slow down virtually without notice; a crest in the road is not just another part of the road, but is a danger point where a motorist, coming in the opposite direction, may well seek to pass on the rise.
All these situations, and countless others besides, call for consideration by the reasonable driver because experience has repeatedly shown that perils on the road, as time goes by, seem to be giving less and less warning of their emergence. Of course, what I have said has its corollaries for other road users, but because of the marked increase in the power, weight and speed of today’s vehicles, as compared with those of the immediate post-war period, the implications for the drivers of motor vehicles, are in my view, stronger.
The courts have, from time to time, spoken of the need to guard against human follies, but, in my opinion, there is a need for courts to emphasize that the guarding referred to includes an ever-present attempt to foresee dangers well ahead of the immediate driving situation.
27. On the appellant’s own admission this was either the first or very nearly the first occasion on which he rode on this motorcycle with a pillion passenger. The incident when the front wheel of the motorcycle left the roadway demonstrates how even an experienced rider can confront a circumstance leading to potential loss of control. The appellant explained how the rear vision mirrors, because of his body size, allowed only a limited view to the rear. His helmet precluded him from being aware of and hearing the noise of the police siren. Accordingly his view was obscured and his ability to hear was impaired. Notwithstanding the appellant’s asserted motorcycle experience and riding abilities, it does not follow that riding at the speed and in the manner found by the magistrate was safe.
Allowance must be made for other road users, the appellant’s pillion passenger, the appellant himself, the police officer and the road users at the roundabout. A road user must contemplate that other drivers will expect road users to comply with the road rules and in particular to comply with speed limits. Motorists and others in this area would not expect to encounter a motorcycle travelling at 100 to 120 kilometres per hour.
28. Having regard to all the circumstances, it was open to and appropriate for the magistrate to conclude that the appellant was driving at a speed and in a manner that was dangerous to the public.
29. This appeal is dismissed.
All of it is true. Here is a police photograph of the pillion I had with me at the time. Can you blame me for not being able to keep it down?
hope you got some
id rather you shake those boobs
They should have let him off just for having that on the back.
sorry, but I really suck at wheelie's. Is it alright if I simply give you a standing ovation.
If a kitten's corpse is not discovered, has it really been killed?
Apparently these days you dont need a corpse to convict.
What reaction did you expect?
I remember doing a wheelie on the open road somewhere for a bike coming the other way and I clearly could see him shaking his head in disgust.
Maybe it was in admirement?